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Abstract
In this paper we devise a slightly modiﬁed version of the Vote with the Wallet
Game used by Becchetti et al.(2015, 2017) to the use of Social Media, where the player
decides whether to responsibly share social knowledge or not. We follow the point
of view of Bennet and Bennet (2010) according to which another social settings may
emerge trough the so-called "process of collaborative entanglement". In this environ-
ment members of a community interact continuously with strong emotional feelings to
combine the sources of knowledge and the beneﬁciaries of that knowledge and move
toward a common direction. By applying our model to the quantum game theory we
substantially conﬁrm that the cooperative strategy becomes the optimal one depending
on frequency of interactions and people cultural, geographical and social reachability
and traceablity.
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1 Introduction
Thanks to the Internet and the digital technologies, nowadays we can share information and
knowledge, spread culture and education faster and more easily than before. The collective
body of knowledge produced by the community or social circle is what is known as Social
Knowledge. In a social or cultural context, Social Knowledge can be the collective knowledge
based on small groups, like a family, or it can be a massive and constantly evolving body
of knowledge, like Wikipedia. According to the theory of Social Knowledge it is not simply
the total sum of a group's knowledge, but it is the product of relationships and connections
within a particular group. These groups are known as social knowledge networks, and their
size and inﬂuence can often depend on the group topics, features and relationships. On a
much larger scale, the Internet has produced massive social knowledge networks through
websites or other sites where people regularly gather to share information on a particular
topic. Websites like these are are known as wiki, namely a digital application that allows
for collaboration and often requires user-generated content to remain relevant. Because
of the social knowledge networks and wikis don't rely on the on central control to care
information but they are an evolving collective knowledge resource produced by community
participation, the most critical challenge is how to use them eﬀectively in a collaborative
way and avoiding the fake news. There is a broad range of literature which analyzes the
problem of how detecting fake news and trolling/haters (see for instance Tschiatschek S.,
2018, and the literature there cited) and the rising phenomenon of online incivility, that
has made the environment of social networking sites hostile to many users. In a recent
work Antoci et al.(2016) studied how the eﬀect of social media on trust varies depending on
the civility or incivility of online interactions. By conducting a experiment in a Facebook
the authors found that participants exposed to civil Facebook interaction are signiﬁcantly
more trusting(for a survey on this topic see literature there cited). In this paper we explore
another way of stimulate cooperation in the use of social media, based on the model on
collaborative entanglement (Bennet and Bennet, 2010). This is a highly participatory model
where knowledge creators, who may be individual, team, or community, and the audience
interact continuously with strong emotional feeling to combine the sources of knowledge
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and the beneﬁciaries of that knowledge and move toward a common direction to satisfy
community needs. From these interactions it emerges both a new knowledge informed by
learned expertise and a large amount of tacit knowledge (embodied, eﬀective and intuitive)-
due to the continuing iterative loop of collective learning, that visibly aﬀects the community
. Therefore, "the process of collaborative entanglement among individuals not only helps to
provide a speciﬁc solution to a current issue, but seeds the ground for continuous community
self improvement, collaboration and sustainability" (Bennet and Bennet, 2010). We analyze
this framework by using a quantum game model, substantially based on the pioneristic
work of Eisert et al.(2000). Quantum game models have been largely applied in game
theory mainly to show how new cooperative equilibria arise when players act as entangled
particles. In their recent work Guo et al.(2008) depict a complete survey of these models
and their vaste application. In this work, our aim is to point out the importance of textit
Media education, namely the education for the fair and correct use of social media since age
school, also with the collaboration of families. Our starting point is that, given the level
of dissemination the use of Social Media has reached, they have become of essential use
nowadays. However, the existence of many haters and fake news can make the use of Social
Media dangerous to the sensible dissemination of knowledge and, even worst, can harm
people. Benvenuto et al.(2017) provide a systematic large scale measurement and analysis
study of hate speech in online social media. In their work, they use large data sets from
two social media providers: Whisper and Twitter. The ﬁrst data set counts up more than
27 million whispers and the second gathers more than 512 million tweets. Furthermore, the
authors set up and validate a methodology to identify hate speech and delineate a deﬁnition
of hate speech. According to them, hate speech is " an oﬀensive post, motivated, in whole
or in a part, by the writer's bias against an aspect of a group of people The oﬀended aspects
can encompass oine hate crimes , based on race, religion, disability, sexual orientation,
ethnicity, or gender. However, they might also include behavioral and physical aspects."
In light of the above, besides the positive spillovers of knowledge dissemination, the use
of Social Media brings out the need of protection from haters as well as from fake news.
To protect ourself, we can use appropriate methods and laws, but they can be very expen-
sive and not always feasible. Although they are fundamental, the entanglement approach
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represents another additional (not alternative) solution which consists in educating people,
since the age school, to an appropriate use of social Media. According to this approach the
right information beneﬁts everyone not only because it increases social knowledge, but also
because people feel better as they do their civic duty, belong to a group, increase the own
and the others' awareness and that there will be around now another person informed and
corrected, etc. We see this through a simple model of game theory, by using a version of
the modiﬁed game of Becchetti et al.(2015, 2017), which is more suitable for our purpose
being a cooperative game model in which the change comes from citizens, from bottomed up
pressure. In Section 2 we devise this modiﬁed version by highlighting the importance of laws
and methods to correct fake and haters. While in Section 3 we see additional eﬀects of the
entanglement model by applying our model to the quantum game theory we substantially
conﬁrm that the cooperative strategy becomes the optimal one depending on frequency of
interactions and people cultural, geographical and social reachibility/traceablity. In the
Discussion section we summarize our results and discuss the media education importance
to enforce the entanglement in practice.
2 The Basic Model
In this Section we aim to set up the basic features and parameters that we think are at work
in a classical game when the agents must decide whether to cooperate or not in building and
sharing Social Knowledge. To this purpose we extensively draw from the Model of Becchetti
et al.(2015, 2017) by using a slightly modiﬁed version of that game where now we denote
by:
• c the real costs (bills, expenses to stay connected, etc.) and the cost opportunity of the
free time spent on Social instead of other leisure activities or face-to-face interactions.
• b the positive beneﬁt related to the enrichment in Knowledge due to the exchange of
information.
• a the individual advantage deriving from interacting with other people at a distance
or just from releasing emotions and contents.
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The individual payoﬀ associated to the strategy of cooperation is:
PCC = b
(
1− f
2
)
+ a
(
l − eh
2
)
− c (1)
where f is the cost to detect fake news, which we may assume is proportional to the
amount of the exchanged Information (i.e. more news and websites people see more probably
they can incur in fake news). The parameter e measures the number of haters that we
assume are exogenous. That is, we adopt the point of view of hating as psychological
disordered behaviour which is substantially independent on the others' responses and which
worsen individual well-being proportionally to individual feelings of empathy and sensitivity
measured by the variable e. Finally the parameter l measures how much a increases thanks
to the others' reply, for instance with the number of "like" and emoticons or comments of
approval received.
Similarly the payoﬀ the agent gets when the strategy chosen is to cooperate while the
other one defects is:
PCD =
b
2
(1− f) + a
2
(l − eh)− c (2)
where now the agent must support the entire cost of detecting fake news f . The defector
instead gets PDC =
b
2 +
a
2 . If both players choose the strategy of defecting they both get 0.
All the parameters are clearly nonnegative: a, h, c, f, h, l, e ∈ [0,∞]
Therefore the ﬁnal set of payoﬀs may be written as it follows:
Ui(S) =

b
(
1− f2
)
+ a
(
l − eh2
)− c ifS = (C,C)
b
2 (1− f) + a2 (l − eh)− c ifS = (C,D)
b
2 +
a
2 ifS = (D,C)
0 ifS = (D,D)
(3)
The Nash Equilibrium of this Social Knowledge Responsible game (since now on SKR) is
the cooperative solution (C,C) if b2 (1− f2 )+ a2 (l−eh) > c, while defection prevails otherwise.
Therefore having a cooperative equilibrium in this classical game strongly depends on:
i) The costs of detecting fake news f . The seriousness of the problem of the raising fake
news and their misconception damages makes critical the need to develop new tech-
niques to tackle this challenge. To this end, Facebook has recently announced a series
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of eﬀorts towards addressing this challenge (Facebook 2016). Fake news and misin-
formation have historically been used as tools for making political or business gains
(Ewen 1998). The institutions have been proposing several solutions, as well as scien-
tiﬁc literature is full of examples and propositions. One of the most interesting can be
the detection of fake news via expert's veriﬁcation or fact-checking (see Solferino et al.,
2015). This methodology has given rise to some third-party fact-checking organiza-
tions such as Snopes3 and Factcheck.org4 and code of principles (Poynter, 2016) that
should be followed by these organizations are build up. However, the volume of news
content that is generated in online social networks has become so vast and the speed
of spread in these networks so fast that developing new computational techniques and
complement the expert veriﬁcation is strongly required (see for instance Conroy and
Chen,2015, for a survey). An alternate approach is to build hybrid human-algorithm
methods via engaging users of online social networks by enabling them to report the
fake news(Thsiactchekck et al.,2018).
ii) The number of haters h. Hate speech is expressly considered in the laws of many
countries that deﬁne it as "a speech intended to degrade, intimidate or incite violence
or prejudicial action against someone based on his/her race, ethnicity, national origin,
religion, sexual orientation, or disability". When coming to statutory debarment of the
hate speech, controversies arise. Firstly because of the conﬂict with the shielded right
to freedom of expression of every citizen. However, one can counter-argument that
the violence of some hate speeches, the way they depict marginalized individuals or
groups sometimes reach a demeaning and derogatory pick so that freedom of expression
is quickly put out of weight. As it was not enough, we have to add that marginalized
people do need societal protection against any form of abuse. In our society, interlacing
mechanisms of oppressions make hate speech even powerful and dangerous to the very
"zoa" (i.e. "natural life") of individuals, not only to their "bios politikos" (i.e. "the
good life characteristic of participation in the polis".). It is indeed the case that hate
speech not only can humiliate, chastise and exclude the person or the group they hurl
abuse at but will hardly damage people by discriminating them according to gender,
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race, sexuality, disability status, religion etc. This risk of harming people and going
back to old - but not soothe - discrimination culture is perhaps the primary reason why
more and more countries are adopting laws against hate speech. For instance, very
exemplary is the case of Germany which has recently enforced a law that demands
social media sites move quickly to remove hate speech, fake news and illegal materials.
Websites that do not delete "obviously illegal" posts could face ﬁnes of up to 50mln
euros. The law gives the networks 24 hours after notice to act against the law-breaking
material.
3 The Model of Quantum Entanglement in Social Media
The Quantum entanglement is a physical phenomenon that occurs when pairs or groups
of particles interact in a way such that, even when they are separated by a large distance,
the quantum state of each particle cannot be described independently on the others. That
is, they are not individual particles but are an inseparable whole. To better understand
the property of entanglement we can assume the two particles are located in two distant
countries A and B. If we want to measure a particular characteristic of one of these particles,
after we get a result then measure the other particle using the same criterion and we ﬁnd
that the result of the measurement of the second particle will match (in a complementary
sense) the result of the measurement of the ﬁrst particle.
The quantum mechanic and the concept of entanglement has been largely applied in
recent years in Game theory, shading light in new important results with respect to the
traditional ones. For instance in his pioneristic work on quantum games Eisert et al(2000)
investigated the quantization of nonzero sum games. For the particular case of the Prisoners'
Dilemma they show that it is ever possible to construct a particular quantum strategy which
always gives a reward if played against any classical strategy.
In this paper we strongly refer to this quantum version of the Prisoner Dilemma as devel-
oped in Eisert et al.(2000) and we apply it to a context of our Social Knowledge responsible
game devised in the previous section. We aim to show that, depending on players'social
cultural and social proximity and interactions, the cooperative quantum strategy may give
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a higher reward with respect to the classical one even when the number of haters and the
costs of fake news make it not proﬁtable.
We rewrite classical game in term of matrix as:
C D
C (r, r) (p, t)
D (t, p) (s, s)
 = (4)
C D
C b
(
1− f2
)
+ a
(
1− eh2
)− c, b(1− f2)+ a (l − eh2 )− c b2 (1− f) + a2 (1− eh)− c, a2 + b2
D a2 +
b
2 ,
b
2 (1− f) + a2 (l − eh)− c (0, 0)
(5)
where we have normalized l to 1.
For a quantum formulation of the classical game of SRK developed in Section2, we
proceed like Eisert et al.(2000) by assigning the possible outcomes of the classical strategies
D and C two basis vectors |D〉 and |C〉 in the Hilbert space of a two-state system, i.e. a
qubit. At each instance, the state of the game is described by a vector in the tensor product
space which is spanned by the classical game basis |CC〉, |CD〉, |DC〉 and |DD〉, where the
ﬁrst and second entry refer to the ﬁrst and the second player, called A and B respectively.
The board of our quantum-game is depicted in Fig. 1. The ﬁnal total expected payoﬀ may
Figure 1: The setup of a two-player quantum game.
be derived as weighted sum of each possible payoﬀ and may be in general written as (for
more details about how to derive a quantum game see Eisert et al,2000):
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Π = rPCC + pPCD + tPDC + sPDD
Therefore the payoﬀ operators for each of the two players are
PA(SA, SB) =
[
b
(
1− f
2
)
+ a
(
1− eh
2
)
− c
]
PCC + 0 · PDD +
(
a
2
+
b
2
)
PDC+ (6)
[
b
2
(1− f) + a
2
(1− eh)− c
]
PCD,
PB(SA, SB) =
[
b
(
1− f
2
)
+ a
(
1− eh
2
)
− c
]
PCC + 0 · PDD +
(
a
2
+
b
2
)
PCD+ (7)[
b
2
(1− f) + a
2
(1− eh)− c
]
PDC .
The ﬁnal state of the quantum game is
|Ψf 〉 = Jˆ†(UˆA ⊗ UˆB)Jˆ |CC〉
where J is the entanglement operator acting on the two bits, J its adjoint, is the disentan-
glement operator, and UA, UB are the single-bit operators selected by the two players, that
in other words measure the density matrix applied to the expected payoﬀ to evaluate the
ﬁnal result.
The general single-qubit operator or density matrix which must be applied to the ex-
pected payoﬀ is  eiφ cos θ2 sin θ2
− sin θ2 e−iφ cos θ2

where o ≤ θ ≤ pi and 0 ≤ φ ≤ pi2 .
where the angle θ and the spin φ represent the analogue of players' social cultural-
social proximity and frequency of interactions as well as the possibility of opening up,
recognizability, reachability, e.g. when the particles have spin φ = pi it means that players
are maximally distant or can never meet (as when particles are on parallel lines). Therefore
for A and B we have respectively:
UˆA = U(θA, φA) =
 eiφA cos θA2 sin θA2
− sin θA2 e−iφA cos θA2

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UˆB = U(θB , φB) =
 eiφB cos θB2 sin θB2
− sin θB2 e−iφB cos θB2
 .
After some manipulations it is possible to show that in this SRK quantum game the ﬁnal
payoﬀ for the agent A becomes (additional details are available upon request): Equation
(6) becomes:
PA(SA, SB) =
[
b
(
1− f
2
)
+ a
(
1− eh
2
)
− c
](
cos2(φA + φB) cos
2 θA
2
cos2
θB
2
)
+
[
b
2
(1− f) + a
2
(1− eh)− c
] [
sinφA cos
θA
2
sin
θB
2
− cosφB sin θA
2
cos
θB
2
]2
+
(
a
2
+
b
2
)[
sinφB sin
θA
2
cos
θB
2
− cosφA cos θA
2
sin
θB
2
]2
.
Equation (7) becomes:
PB(SA, SB) =
[
b
(
1− f
2
)
+ a
(
1− eh
2
)
− c
](
cos2(ΦA + ΦB) cos
2 θA
2
cos2
θB
2
)
+
(
a
2
+
b
2
)[
sinφB sin
θA
2
cos
θB
2
− cosφA cos θA
2
sin
θB
2
]2
+
[
b
2
(1− f) + a
2
(1− eh)− c
] [
sinφA cos
θA
2
sin
θB
2
− cosφB sin θA
2
cos
θB
2
]2
.
The equilibrium solution shows that a lower threshold now is requested to make more
convenient, for both players, to beneﬁt from deviating from D. The cooperative strategy
is associated to the couple (φ, θ) = (pi2 , 0), while the defection strategy corresponds to
(φ, θ) = (pi, 0). In particular, another Nash equilibrium emerges when each player chooses
the cooperative strategy (φ, θ) = (pi2 , 0), as the associated individual payoﬀ now is equal to
PCC which is higher that PDD. This Nash equilibrium, that we call (Qˆ, Qˆ), is unique and
serves as the only acceptable solution of the game. No player could gain without lessening
the other player's expected payoﬀ. In this sense one can say that the dilemma of the original
game has fully disappeared.
If a quantum game is not maximally entangled, that is the probabilities of the possible
outcomes of the game are not uniformly distributed, the entanglement operator may be
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rewritten as follows (see also Sun,2009):
Jˆ = ei
γ
2 Dˆ⊗Dˆ (8)
where the parameter γ ∈ [0, pi2 ) can be considered as a measure for the game's entanglement
that allows to determine the entropy
E = sin2
γ
2
ln sin2
γ
2
− cos2 γ
2
ln cos2
γ
2
of the initial state |Ψ0〉.
For a maximally entangled quantum game γ = pi2 and the unique feasible NE equilibrium of
the quantum game is (Qˆ, Qˆ). Otherwise when the game is not maximally entangled we adopt
Qˆ only as cooperator's strategy and the modiﬁed matrix in the non-maximally entangled
quantum game becomes: b(1− f2)+ a (1− eh2 )− c (a2 + b2 ) sin2 γ
(a2 +
b
2 ) cos
2 γ b2 (1− f) + a2 (1− eh)− c
 (9)
The Prisoner Dilemma is resolved if
sin γ >
b
2
(1− f) + a
2
(1− eh)− c (10)
which it is ever satisﬁed for γ ∈ [0, pi2 ).
For simplicity we restrict our attention to the production and beneﬁts of social knowledge,
so that we assume a = 0, c = 0. Notice that while in the classical version of the game
for b2 (1 − f2 ) >, that is f > 2, the cooperative strategy never represents a feasible NE
equilibrium, instead in the quantum game it is a possible solution depending only on (10).
Therefore the condition above for a cooperative unique NE substantially means that the
beneﬁt that comes from interacting entangled with each other even when defecting gives
the player a greater beneﬁt than when he chooses to cooperate while others defecting but
without entanglement. This result substantially depends on the values of the parameters θ,
φ and γ. Notice that in our analysis essentially θ and φ represent the distance and frequency
of interactions among agents'. Therefore the entanglement is greater for less distant people
(not only geographically but also in terms of cultural and social diﬀerences) and when
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they are easily reachable/traceable. In this case, even if the costs of detecting fake news
(and ﬁghting heaters) are huge, the entanglement give to the agents an additional beneﬁts
when cooperating that derive from contributing to the change in the society, in spreading
the right information,as well as rising awareness, self-esteem, altruism, fairness, developing
critical thinking, etc. This make the cooperative strategy more attractive also when the
other agents might defect if the entropy of the system is not too high,i.e. γ ∈ [0, pi2 ].
This result has been conﬁrmed by the recent paper of Sabatini and Sarracino (2017) who
show that the use of Social Networks has a positive impact on well-being also because it
increases the probability of face-to-face interactions.
4 Discussion
Nowadays Social Media are part of our daily culture and communicative practices in the
family, at school and with the group of friends. In this paper we have devised a simple
Quantum game theoretical model on how to foster a more beneﬁcial and fair use of Social
Media. This model is based on the physical concept of the entanglement. In this section we
discuss how it mat be built in the society trough the work of schools and families. Indeed it
is necessary then that schools, on the one hand, are geared to understand how to bring out
consumer practices and values so to create more awareness in students. On the other hand
they must promote training meetings to involve families so that they can pay more attention
to their children media consumption, both in terms of content and emotions arouse, and
consider the Media as an area to deepen explore and to be challenged. The problem of media
education was also expressively taken into account by the European Parliament, trough
the resolution of 16 December 2008, the Parliament recognized the importance of media
education as an essential element to increase cultural literacy, awareness and to promote
the active civic participation of people. Consequently the Parliament alleged that media
education should be part of formal education to which all children have access and be an
integral part of the educational programme in all the kind of schools and degree.
An exemplary case in this regard is represented in Italy by the schools involved in
the italian project of Corecom (http : //www.corecomragazziemiliaromagna.it). The
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projects carried out for ﬁve years during which,several activities have been realized whose
mainstream consisted in the realization of free tools, Research, sharing of practices, training,
involvement of families have been the mainstays of activity. The projects involve in substance
the design and the realization of ﬁlms, videos, articles, comments to the same and their
analysis, learning the information necessary to interpret the contents manifest and latent,
the recognition of the own and the others' emotional responses, self-awareness, etc. This
methodology has been substantially inspired by the ﬁve principles of pedagogy of media
education identiﬁed by De Smedt et al.(2013).
The ﬁrst, used very frequently by teachers, consists in the practical production of Media,
that is it requires students to create a transmission radio, an announcement, a short ﬁlm,
a publication, or a text. Putting students in the position of producers is considered by
educators a relevant way for students to evolve their relationship with the media. The
second is the decomposition of message and consists in choosing a medium and analyzing
it in depth to discover which mechanisms of signiﬁcance are at work, what elements are
contained and how they produce meaning. The third pedagogy consists in teaching directly
some concepts, trough frontal lessons, to learn some contents taken for example by the
Humanities (economics, anthropology, sociology, political science),which are very useful to
analyze the media.The fourth is based on introspective processes: it invites the pupil to
take awareness of his own perceptions, of the diﬀerent modiﬁcations that the media provoke
on his sensibility, his needs, feelings, concerns, expectations in an environment of sharing
and socializing of experiences and opinions, using speciﬁc and appropriate terms. Finally
the ﬁfth pedagogy De Smedt et al.(2013) suggested refers to the game and problem solving:
simulation games, roles and activities that do not propose the only media production, but
that present to the young students a problem that needs to be solved. Pupils have to ﬁnd
strategies to get by themselves; the solution they will ﬁnd will be a new competence that
they will have acquired.
The aim of Social Education is to increase media literacy and acquire the key competence
in the information and communication society. So that all potential users get the ability
to autonomously use the various media, to understand and evaluate the diﬀerent aspects of
content of media, to communicate in heterogeneous contexts and to produce and disseminate
13
media content, to ﬁlter and classify the information sought in the tide of data and images
oﬀered by new media. Media education is a key element of consumer information policy, a
conscious and competent approach to copyright issues, the active democratic participation
of citizens and the promotion of intercultural dialogue. This is necessary to ﬁnally return to
the media their primary function of information diﬀuser in real time and to break down the
inability to communicate at a distance instead of being transformed as it happens nowadays
in a tool of opportunistic falsiﬁcation of news or a basket where to vomit the own negative
emotions.
References
[1] Antoci, A., Delﬁno, A., Paglieri, F., Panebianco, F., Sabatini, F.,2016, "Civility vs
Incivility in Online Social Interactions: An Evolutionary Approach", PLoS ONE 11(11):
e0164286.
[2] Becchetti L., Pelligra V., Salustri F., 2017, "Testing for heterogeneity of preferences in
randomized experiments: a satisfaction-based approach applied to multiplayer prisoner'
dilemmas", Applied Economics Letters, Taylor and Francis Journals, 24(10):722-726.
[3] Becchetti L., Salustri F., 2015, "The Vote With the Wallet as a Multiplayer Prisoner's
Dilemma", CEIS Research Paper 359, Tor Vergata University, CEIS.
[4] Bennet D., Bennet A., 2010, "Social Learning from the Inside Out: The Creation and
Sharing of Knowledge from the Mind/Brain Perspective" in Social Knowledge: Using
Social Media to Know What You Know ed. by John P. Girard and JoAnn L. Girard,
Ch., pp.1-23.
[5] Benvenuto F., Mondal M., Silva L.A., 2017, "A Measurement Study of Hate Speech in
Social Media", HT17 Proceedings of the 28th ACM Conference on Hypertext and Social
Media.
14
[6] Conroy N.J.., Chen Y., Rubin V,2015, "Automatic deception detection: Methods for
ﬁnding fake news.", Proceedings of the Association for Information Science and Tech-
nology 52(1):1-4.
[7] De Smedt T., Jerry J., Fastrez, P.,2013, "Organising Media as Social Objects: an ex-
ploratory assessment of a core media literacy competence", Media Education Research
Journal, 40(1):42-57.
[8] Eisert J., Wilkins M.,2000, "Quantum games", Journal of Mathematical Optimization
J. 47:2543-56.
[9] Ewen S, 1998. A social history of spin. BasicBooks
[10] Faceboo,Dec.2016. News Feed FYI: Addressing Hoaxes and Fake News. https :
//newsroom.fb.com/news/2016/12/news − feed − fyi − addressing − hoaxes −
andfake− news/.
[11] Guo H.,Zhang J., Koehler G.J., 2008, "A survey of quantum games", Journal Decision
Support Systems archive, 46(1):318-332.
[12] Poynter 2016, International Fact-Checking Network: Fact-Checkers Code Princi-
ples. https : //www.poynter.org/internationalfact − checking − network − fact −
checkerscode− principles.(September)
[13] Sabatini F., Sarracino F., 2017, "Online Networks and Subjective Well-Being", Kyklos
70(3): 456-480.
[14] Solferino N., Taurino SF, Tessitore ME,2015, "Manipulating Persuasion in Debates:
Fact Checking's Usefulness", 5(4):447-452.
[15] Sun Z.W., 2009,"The Rule for Evolution of Cooperation in Quantum Games", Acta
Physica Polonia A, 116(2):135-140.
[16] Tschiatschek S., Singla A., Rodriguez MG., Merchant A., Krause A., 2018, "Fake News
Detection in Social Networks via Crowd Signals", arXiv:1711.09025v2.
15
